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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
EPA has delegated its permit-reviewing power to the EAB, 
thus granting the Board subject-matter jurisdiction over 
Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) preconstruction 
permits. 40 C.F.R. § 124.19 (2015); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475, 7601 
(2012). Both petitioners timely filed for review of the Board’s 
order, In re Sylvanergy, No. 15-0123, slip op. at 1 (EAB June 1, 
2015), so this Court has jurisdiction over all “final action[s]” 
taken under the CAA by the New Union Air Resources Board 
(NUARB) through its EPA-delegated authority, 42 U.S.C. § 
7607(b)(1). At its root, this petition centers on an interlocutory 
order and a final decision: respectively, NUARB’s denial of the 
Non-Applicability Determination (NAD) and its requirement of 
best available control technology (BACT) for Sylvanergy’s 
greenhouse emissions. Thus, this Court has jurisdiction over the 
BACT determination, but not over the denial of the NAD. 
 
 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Does this Court have jurisdiction to review NUARB’s denial 
of the requested NAD? 
 
II. Assuming jurisdiction over the denial of the NAD, is 
Sylvanergy’s proposed plant a “major emitting facility” subject to 
PSD review? 
 
III. Did NUARB properly determine that a biomass-fueled 
facility subject to PSD review for its non-greenhouse emissions is 
also subject to review as an emitter of greenhouse gases? 
 
IV. Did NUARB permissibly reject wood gasification and partial 
carbon capture and storage as BACT? 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol7/iss1/3
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V. Did NUARB properly impose the Sustainable Forest Plan as 
BACT? 
 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. FACTS 
Sylvanergy, L.L.C. resolved to construct a biomass-fired 
electricity generation and wood pellet fuel production facility (the 
“Facility” or the “Power Plant”) in Forestdale, New Union. 
Sylvanergy, slip op. at 5. The Facility will produce 500 million 
Btu’s each hour, and at capacity would burn 150,000 tons of dry 
weight each year. Id. It will consist of an advanced stoker design 
wood-fired boiler and two ultra-low sulfur diesel start-up burners, 
each with a maximum heat input rate of 60 million Btu’s per 
hour. Id. 
Based on a 96% capacity factor, the Facility has the potential 
to emit 255 tons per year of carbon monoxide, in addition to a 
host of other pollutants. Id. Worried about the impact of log-truck 
deliveries to the Facility, Forestdale limited its operation to no 
more than 6,500 hours per year. Id. Only Forestdale’s building 
inspector has the authority to enforce the limitation, which in 
effect restricts the Facility to 75% capacity. Id. At 75% capacity, 
the Facility will emit 190 tons per year of carbon monoxide. Id. 
The Facility has the potential to emit 350,000 tons per year of 
greenhouse gases in the form of carbon dioxide equivalents. Id. 
EPA has delegated authority to NUARB to issue 
preconstruction permits under § 165 of the Clean Air Act. Id. On 
January 15, 2013, Sylvanergy petitioned NUARB for an NAD, a 
determination that it needed no PSD preconstruction permit 
under § 165 of the Act. Id. In an interlocutory order, NUARB 
denied Sylvanergy’s request on grounds that the Power Plant was 
a major emitting facility in an attainment area under the Act—
notwithstanding the locally-enforced hours limitation—and thus 
subject to more rigorous PSD review. Id. at 6. This preliminary 
3
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finding ushered Sylvanergy into the heart of the PSD permitting 
process. Id. 
In crafting Sylvanergy’s permit, NUARB thoroughly 
analyzed the available control alternatives and determined the 
BACT for the pollutants emitted by the Facility, as required by § 
165(a)(4). Id. at 6–7. Concerning greenhouse gases, NUARB 
employed a top-down approach in analyzing the available control 
alternatives. Id. First, NUARB considered carbon capture and 
storage as the technology capable of achieving the greatest 
reduction in emissions; the agency rejected the technology as 
technically infeasible. Id. at 6. Next, the agency considered the 
use of alternative fuels, like natural gas and oil; NUARB 
concluded that such fuels would impermissibly redefine the 
Facility. Id. at 7. NUARB also concluded that wood gasification 
and partial carbon capture and storage (WGPCCS) would 
impermissibly redefine the source. Id. Finally, NUARB 
considered a sustainable forest plan, requiring a dedicated 
reforestation area. Id. The agency concluded that acquisition of 
25,000 hectares of forest land at a cost of approximately ten 
million dollars was economically feasible, and that at an assumed 
production rate of ten dry tons of wood per hectare per year, the 
area would offset approximately seventy percent of the Facility’s 
emissions. Id. 
On September 12, 2013, NUARB published its draft permit 
for the Facility, which included the Sustainable Forest Plan as 
BACT for the Facility’s greenhouse gas emissions. Id. at 6. Save 
Our Climate, Inc. (SOC), a non-profit environmental protection 
group, commented extensively; the New Union Loggers 
Association also commented. Id. On June 12, 2014—after nine 
months during which the agency considered the permit’s 
characteristics—NUARB issued its PSD permit for the 
Sylvanergy Facility. Id. It retained the Sustainable Forest Plan 
as BACT for greenhouse gas emissions at the Facility. Id. at 7. 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
After issuance of the permit, Sylvanergy and SOC both filed 
timely petitions for review with the Environmental Appeals 
Board. Id. at 7. Sylvanergy challenged the denial of the NAD and 
the permit’s imposition of the Sustainable Forest Plan; SOC 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol7/iss1/3
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challenged NUARB’s refusal to require wood gasification and 
partial carbon capture and storage as BACT for the Facility. Id. 
The EAB denied both petitions, pointing to a lack of jurisdiction 
over the NAD and an absence of any clear factual or legal error 
that would justify overturning the BACT determination; it then 
ordered the Administrator of Region XIII to publish notice of final 
action. Id. at 13–14. The parties then petitioned this Court for 
judicial review. Id. at 1.  
 
 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
As a threshold matter, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the 
NAD denial. To protect the administrative process, Congress 
subjects only “final action” to CAA § 307 jurisdiction. Because the 
denial neither consummated NUARB’s decisionmaking nor 
determined Sylvanergy’s rights and obligations, it was not 
jurisdictional final action. Moreover, Sylvanergy cannot twist § 
704 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to dodge the plain 
rule of § 307, because the denial was committed to NUARB’s 
discretion as a matter of resource management and agency 
inaction. Accordingly, APA § 704 simply does not apply. 
Even assuming jurisdiction, this Court should not disturb 
NUARB’s determination that the Power Plant is a major emitting 
facility. Although not a fossil-fuel fired source—as shown by the 
plain language of the CAA and EPA guidance—the Facility still 
has the potential to emit more than 250 tons per year of carbon 
monoxide when operating at 96% capacity. NUARB properly 
determined the Facility to be a major emitter because no federally 
enforceable limitation brings it below the emissions threshold. 
NUARB acted in accordance with EPA guidance, and the 
Agency’s expertise on the law and science of the Clean Air Act 
commands deference. This Court should therefore affirm 
NUARB’s classification of the Power Plant as a major emitting 
facility. 
NUARB properly subjected the Power Plant to BACT for 
greenhouse gases. The Supreme Court recognizes that regulation 
5
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of greenhouse gases in other contexts triggered PSD 
requirements for these emissions, and has ruled that permitting 
agencies may require BACT for greenhouse gas emissions. 
Because neither the text nor the policy of the Act justify an 
exception for biogenic greenhouse gases, application of BACT to 
the Facility was proper.  
This Court should uphold NUARB’s determination that the 
Sustainable Forest Plan constitutes BACT for the Facility’s 
greenhouse gas emissions. In making its determination, the 
agency properly employed a top-down approach to analyze the 
universe of available control alternatives. In line with EPA 
guidance, after deciding against WGPCCS, NUARB properly 
embraced the Sustainable Forest Plan as BACT. The agency 
permissibly rejected WGPCCS because it redefines the source—
requiring it to undergo significant modifications, thereby 
changing its fundamental scope. Instead, the agency properly 
settled on the Plan as BACT; the Plan is economically feasible, 
effective at offsetting the Facility’s emissions, and entirely within 
the control of Sylvanergy. 
 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW 
THE NAD BECAUSE IT WAS NEITHER FINAL 
ACTION NOR REVIEWABLE UNDER THE APA. 
Section 307 of the CAA grants this Court jurisdiction to 
review “final action[s]” taken by EPA under the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 
7607(b)(1). By only opening the courthouse doors to final actions, 
the CAA seeks to preserve the integrity of EPA’s robust 
administrative procedures—reflecting faith in EPA adjudications 
and congressional judgment that the Agency should not have to 
shoulder the burden of piecemeal judicial review. FTC v. 
Standard Oil Co. of Cal. (SOCAL), 449 U.S. 232, 242 (1980). 
Because the NAD was not a “final action,” this Court lacks 
jurisdiction to review its denial. Similarly, APA § 704 does not 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol7/iss1/3
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authorize this Court to review the NAD on review of the final 
permit, because the denial was committed to NUARB’s discretion 
and hence unreviewable under APA § 701(a)(2).  
As a question of jurisdiction, this Court reviews this issue on 
a de novo standard. Columbia Riverkeeper v. U.S. Coast Guard, 
761 F.3d 1084, 1091 (9th Cir. 2014). And as the party that would 
invoke judicial review, Sylvanergy must carry the burden of 
proving jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 
511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).  
 A. The NAD was not a “final action,” and therefore 
falls outside this Court’s jurisdiction under § 
307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act. 
As explained by the Supreme Court, “final action” under § 
307 carries the same meaning as “final agency action” under the 
Administrative Procedure Act. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 
531 U.S. 457, 478 (2001); see 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012). The APA does 
not define “final agency action,” and the Supreme Court has 
wrestled with the term for decades. 33 Charles Alan Wright & 
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 8397 (3d ed. 
2004) (bemoaning the confused state of the case law). But the 
crux of the term is the word final, owing to the broad APA 
definition of “agency action” as well as the strong judicial policy 
in favor of protecting the administrative process. 5 U.S.C. § 
551(13). 
Under the Court’s latest interpretation, agency action is final 
only if it meets two requirements. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 
177–78 (1997). 
First, the action must mark the consummation of the agency’s 
decisionmaking process—it must not be of a merely tentative or 
interlocutory nature. And second, the action must be one by 
which rights and obligations have been determined, or from 
which legal consequences will flow. 
Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Only if both 
conditions are met is the action final for purposes of judicial 
review. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178. 
7
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The finality of an NAD is an issue of first impression under 
the Bennett standard.1 Thus, without persuasive case law, this 
Court should look to the NAD’s place within the statutory scheme 
of the CAA to resolve the question. Because Sylvanergy cannot 
carry its burden of proof that the denial of the NAD satisfies 
one—let alone both—of Bennett’s prongs, the NAD was not final 
and this Court lacks jurisdiction under § 307. See Kokkonen, 511 
U.S. at 377. 
i. The NAD was not final because it neither 
marked the consummation of the 
administrative process nor determined rights 
and obligations. 
The NAD begins, rather than ends, the permitting process: it 
represents EPA’s opinion that a stationary source qualifies as a 
“major emitting facility” subject to the PSD program, and 
presages a lengthy permitting review. See 42 U.S.C. § 7475. 
Although the NAD is the last word on the threshold question of 
PSD applicability, definitiveness on a preliminary issue does not 
itself make for final action. Indus. Customers of Nw. Util. v. 
Bonneville Power Admin., 408 F.3d 638, 647 (9th Cir. 2005); 
SOCAL, 449 U.S. at 244 (recognizing that preliminary agency 
action is not final, even if it commits the regulated party to a full 
permitting proceeding of “substantial and unrecoupable cost”).2 
 
  1. The two reported decisions on the finality of NAD-like determinations 
on PSD applicability were both pre-Bennett decisions—they did not address 
whether the action was final in the modern sense of the term. See P.R. Cement 
Co. v. EPA, 889 F.2d 292, 294 (1st Cir. 1989) (relying on the concepts of ripeness 
and exhaustion to find that an NAD was final action); Hawaiian Elec. Co. v. 
EPA, 723 F.2d 1440, 1442–43 (9th Cir. 1984) (same); cf. Unity08 v. FEC, 596 
F.3d 861, 865 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (explaining that finality is distinct from ripeness 
and exhaustion). Accordingly, these cases should not persuade this Court. 
  2. This Court should not warp the collateral-order doctrine to find that 
the NAD is reviewable as an order “collateral” to the PSD-permitting process. 
Cf. Hale v. Norton, 476 F.3d 694 (9th Cir. 2007). The doctrine simply does not 
apply here: the PSD permit reflects the denial of the NAD, which means that 
the NAD necessarily merged into the final permit. SOCAL, 449 U.S. at 246 
(declining to apply the doctrine to an agency complaint of a violation where the 
complaint was merely “a step toward” the final decision on the merits, and 
would merge into that decision). More importantly, the doctrine does not apply 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol7/iss1/3
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Thus, because denying the NAD was merely the first step toward 
a PSD permit, the denial was an “interlocutory” decision that did 
not “consummat[e]” NUARB’s “decisionmaking process.” Bennett, 
520 U.S. at 178. Accordingly, it cannot be a “final action” 
reviewable under CAA § 307.  
Even assuming the satisfaction of Bennett’s first prong, the 
NAD is not final action because it is no more than NUARB’s 
opinion on the application of law to fact. Standing alone, the 
denial of the NAD has no legal force; all of Sylvanergy’s legal 
obligations under the PSD program stem from the CAA itself, not 
the NAD decision. Luminant Generation Co., LLC v. EPA, 757 
F.3d 439, 442 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding that EPA notices of 
violation did not meet Bennett’s second prong as the operator’s 
rights and obligations did not flow from the notices but from the 
Clean Air Act). Both before and after the NAD’s denial, 
Sylvanergy was under an obligation not to build a major emitting 
facility in Forestdale without a PSD permit—nothing changed 
when NUARB rejected Sylvanergy’s petition. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a). 
Rather, the denial reflected NUARB’s opinion that, under § 
169(1) of the CAA, the proposed plant would be a major emitting 
facility. Insofar as the NAD is just NUARB’s adoption of one 
particular view of the statute, it is a far cry from final action. 
AT&T Co. v. EEOC, 270 F.3d 973, 975 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (rejecting 
the argument that an agency “takes final action when it embraces 
one view of the law and rejects another,” even when “that view is 
adverse to the [regulated] party”). Thus, because the denial was 
neither the consummation of NUARB’s decisionmaking process 
nor a determination of Sylvanergy’s rights and obligations—and 
certainly not both—it was not the sort of final action that this 
Court can review. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178; 42 U.S.C. § 
7607(b)(1). 
ii. Binding EPA regulations reinforce this result. 
EPA regulations provide that “agency action on a . . . PSD 
permit” is only final upon the exhaustion of “agency review 
procedures” and the issuance of “a final permit decision.” 40 
 
where Congress enacts a “special statutory review procedure” like § 307. See 
City of Rochester v. Bond, 603 F.2d 927, 931 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
9
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C.F.R. § 124.19(l)(2). Those words bind this Court. Section 301 of 
the CAA expressly grants rulemaking authority to EPA as 
“necessary to carry out [its] function under the [Act],” and this 
Court well knows that such an express delegation engages the 
gears of Chevron deference. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(a)(1); Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
Because this regulation was promulgated by notice-and-comment 
rulemaking,3 Chevron limits this Court’s inquiry to whether the 
rule is “arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly 
contrary to the statute.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 
218, 227 (2001).  
A look at the PSD-review process shows that EPA’s 
estimation of finality is not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to 
the statute. Not only does EPA reach the same conclusion as it 
would by applying the Bennett standard, supra Part I.a.i, but 
postponing finality until the end of the permitting process 
furthers the statutory goal of avoiding piecemeal judicial review. 
See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866 (finding agency interpretation 
reasonable because it advanced statutory purposes). Thus, any 
permitting actions taken before the final permit cannot be “final 
action[s]” reviewable under § 307; the denial of the NAD therefore 
falls outside this Court’s jurisdiction. 
 B. The NAD denial was a decision committed to 
NUARB’s discretion, and accordingly this Court’s 
jurisdiction over the PSD permit does not confer 
the ability to review the NAD.  
Although the NAD denial was non-final action outside this 
Court's § 307 jurisdiction, Sylvanergy may twist the APA to 
attempt an end-run around the statutory scheme. NUARB has 
undeniably taken final action by issuing the PSD permit, 40 
C.F.R. § 124.19(l)(2), and Sylvanergy will argue that review of the 
preliminary NAD is proper on review of the final permit. See 5 
U.S.C. § 704. This argument fails because the denial of the NAD 
was committed to NUARB's discretion, and hence unreviewable 
under APA § 701(a)(2). 
 
3. See Consolidated Permit Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 33,290 (May 19, 1980) 
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 124). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol7/iss1/3
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By their own terms, the judicial-review provisions of the APA 
do not apply where “agency action is committed to agency 
discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). The Supreme Court reads 
section (a)(2) as precluding review in two situations: first, where 
a statute is so broadly drawn that a court would lack a 
“meaningful standard” on which to judge the agency action; and 
second, where “the common law of judicial review of agency 
action” traditionally commits the question to the discretion of the 
agency. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–32 (1985); see also 
Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191 (1993) (recognizing that 
section (a)(2) can preclude judicial review by operation of either 
statutory law or the common law).  
As illustrated by the presumptive unreviewability of an 
agency decision to enforce or not enforce, see Heckler, 470 U.S. at 
832, the common law traditionally grants agencies unreviewable 
discretion in two relevant areas: (1) matters dealing with the 
allocation of agency resources, and (2) matters of agency inaction. 
As for the first category, courts traditionally give agencies 
especial leeway to manage their resources, as such questions 
require “a complicated balancing of a number of factors which are 
peculiarly within [the agency’s] expertise.” Lincoln, 508 U.S. at 
191 (citation omitted). A massive statutory scheme like the CAA 
requires EPA to play an administrative game of Whack-a-Mole to 
identify and curtail violations of the Act. See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 
831. In deciding when and where to flex its enforcement muscles 
to most effectively administer the Act, EPA’s “peculiar[] . . . 
expertise” demands a long judicial leash. Id. And as for the 
second category, courts treat agency inaction as discretionary 
because it does not involve the exertion of “coercive power over an 
individual’s liberty or property rights,” and hence steers clear of 
the traditional realm of the judiciary. Id. at 832. Rather, only 
when the agency “exercise[s] its power in some manner” is there 
sufficient “focus for judicial review.” Id. Because the denial of the 
NAD implicates both rationales, section (a)(2) bars application of 
§ 704 to shoehorn review of the NAD into review of the final 
permit.  
At its root, the NAD is a decision tied up in questions of 
resource allocation. The NAD serves as an informal method to 
streamline agency oversight of stationary sources that pose only a 
11
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minor threat to the environment, thus letting NUARB reserve its 
fullest permitting procedures for those emitters that require 
them. See Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and 
Submittal of Implementation Plans, 56 Fed. Reg. 27,630, 27,639 
(June 14, 1991) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 60). Insofar as 
the NAD allows NUARB to triage the calls for its attention, it 
implicates agency discretion. “The agency is far better equipped 
than the courts to deal with the many variables involved in the 
proper ordering of its priorities,” and accordingly courts will not 
review management decisions like the NAD denial. Heckler, 470 
U.S. at 831–32.  
This Court should also view the NAD denial as an instance of 
agency inaction. The denial had no independent legal effect and 
thus involved no exercise of NUARB or EPA’s “coercive power.” 
See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832. Just as non-enforcement has no 
effect on the rights of the regulated party, neither did the NAD 
denial affect Sylvanergy’s rights and obligations. See Luminant 
Generation Co., 757 F.3d at 442; see also supra, Part I.a.i. This 
distinction traditionally leads courts to decline review of agency 
decisions without legal effect. E.g., United States v. Gary, 963 
F.2d 180, 184 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding unreviewable an agency 
opinion that dealt with resource management and did not 
determine the regulated party’s rights and obligations). 
Accordingly, the denial of the NAD is an exercise of agency 
discretion “general[ly] unsuitab[le] for judicial review.” Heckler, 
470 U.S. at 831.  
II. THE POWER PLANT IS A “MAJOR EMITTING 
FACILITY” BECAUSE IT HAS THE “POTENTIAL 
TO EMIT” MORE THAN 250 TONS PER YEAR OF 
CARBON MONOXIDE. 
The CAA requires PSD permits for facilities that both qualify 
as a "major emitting facility" and are located within an 
attainment or unclassifiable areas. 42 U.S.C. § 7475. These 
permits impose numerous requirements “to insure that economic 
growth will occur in a manner consistent with the preservation of 
existing clean air resources.” Id. § 7470. This Court must decide 
whether Sylvanergy’s Power Plant qualifies as a “major emitting 
facility” subject to PSD review. A “major emitting facility” under 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol7/iss1/3
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the Act must either (A) be one of the 28 types of facilities listed 
and “emit, or have the potential to emit, one hundred tons per 
year or more of any air pollutant,” or (B) simply have “the 
potential to emit two hundred and fifty tons per year or more of 
any air pollutant.” Id. § 7479(1).   
Because the CAA does not specify a standard for judicial 
review of this sort of agency action, this Court applies the default 
standard of the APA and asks whether NUARB’s action was 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). This Court may not 
upset NUARB’s decision “if the agency’s path may reasonably be 
discerned.” Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 
461, 496–97 (2004) (citation omitted). Assuming jurisdiction, the 
arbitrary and capricious standard compels this Court to affirm 
NUARB’s determination of PSD applicability. Although the 
Facility does not qualify as a “fossil-fuel fired” source subject to 
the 100 ton-per-year threshold under the Act, it does have the 
“potential to emit” 250 tons or more per year of any air 
pollutant—namely, carbon monoxide. Thus, NUARB did not act 
arbitrarily in determining that the Power Plant was a major 
emitting facility subject to the PSD program. 
 A. The Facility is not subject to the 100 ton-per-year 
threshold under CAA § 169(1) because it is not a 
“fossil-fuel fired” source. 
Sylvanergy proposes a 500 million Btu/hour biomass-fired 
electricity generation unit in Forestdale, New Union. Sylvanergy, 
slip op. at 5. The facility will contain two ultra-low sulfur diesel 
(ULSD) start-up burners that each has a maximum heat input 
rate of 60 million Btu/hour. Id. It contains no other component 
parts potentially subject to the 100 ton-per-year limitation. See 42 
U.S.C. § 7479(1). As a result, this Court must determine if the 
two burners qualify the Facility as a “fossil-fuel fired” source 
subject to the 100 ton-per-year threshold under Section 169(1). 
The unequivocal answer: They do not. 
As the Supreme Court stated in Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43, 
courts take two steps to determine if an agency’s construction of a 
statute warrants deference. First, this Court must determine 
whether Congress spoke directly to the issue. Id. If so, its 
13
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unambiguously expressed intent controls. Id. If not, the second 
step of the analysis asks this Court to determine if the agency has 
interpreted the statute permissibly. Id. Here, this Court should 
stop at step one because the statutory language is clear. However, 
even if this Court finds some ambiguity in the statutory 
language, EPA’s permissible construction of the statute should 
control. 
i. The plain language of CAA § 169(1) only 
reaches sources with a heat input rate greater 
than 250 million Btu/hour. 
Where language is plain, this Court’s only function is to 
enforce a statute according to its terms. Sebelius v. Coler, 133 S. 
Ct. 1886, 1898 (2013). The Supreme Court has been adamant on 
this point: rather than looking for the “reasons for what Congress 
has plainly done,” courts simply give effect to the clear text. Great 
W. Life & Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 217–18 (2002). 
Accordingly, the plain language of the CAA should end this 
Court’s inquiry. 
Congress explicitly aimed to regulate only fossil-fuel fired 
sources that have a heat input rate of 250 million Btu/hour or 
more. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1). By contrast, the ULSD start-up 
burners each only have a heat input rate of 60 million Btu/hour. 
Sylvanergy, slip op. at 5. Neither burner meets the threshold. 
Even combined, the units would only have a heat input rate of 
120 million Btu/hour—still below the regulatory threshold. As a 
result, Congress clearly and unambiguously exempted such small 
fossil-fuel fired sources based on the statutory language. To hold 
otherwise would “render what Congress has plainly done . . . 
devoid of . . . effect.” Great W., 524 U.S. at 217–18.  
Accordingly, any argument by SOC that EPA should regulate 
the ULSD burners as an “embedded source” must fail. See 
LaFleur v. Whitman, 300 F.3d 256, 262 (2d Cir. 2002). This 
contention is rooted in EPA’s guidance that “[a] source which, 
when considered alone, would be major (and hence subject to 
PSD) cannot ‘hide’ within a different and less restrictive source 
category in order to escape applicability.” Office of Air Quality 
Planning & Standards, U.S. EPA, New Source Review Workshop 
Manual A.23 (draft Oct. 1990) (“NSR Manual”). Even considered 
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together, the burners are not “major”: they fail to reach even 50% 
of the threshold heat input rate, and there is no indication in the 
record that the burners themselves would emit 100 tons per year 
of any pollutant. Sylvanergy, slip op. at 5; 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1). As 
a result, this Court should find that Sylvanergy’s Facility is not a 
“fossil-fuel fired” source subject to the 100 ton-per-year threshold. 
ii. Under EPA interpretations, the Facility is not 
a fossil-fuel fired source because the burning 
of fossil fuels is not its primary activity. 
SOC will argue that the statute is ambiguous because it does 
not address how EPA should classify facilities that undertake 
more than one activity that may be regulated under the Act. See 
42 U.S.C. § 7479(1). EPA’s interpretation of the statute resolves 
this alleged ambiguity, and should be afforded deference. Any 
ambiguity would shift this Court’s analysis to whether the 
agency’s interpretation of the statute is permissible. Chevron, 467 
U.S. at 843.  
In August 1980, EPA addressed the classification of multi-
activity facilities by promulgating rules pursuant to its authority 
under § 301 of the Act. See Requirements for Preparation, 
Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans, 45 Fed. Reg. 
52,676 (Aug. 7, 1980) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52). Although 
the rules adopted the statutory definition of “major emitting 
facility” without substantial change, the regulatory preamble 
stated that a multi-activity facility will be classified by its 
primary activity. Id. at 52,695.  EPA stated a source’s primary 
activity “is determined by its principal product or group of 
products produced.” Id. Thus, support facilities—defined as “those 
which convey, store, or otherwise assist in the production of the 
principal product”—do not alter a plant’s classification under the 
Act. Id.  
Under this “primary-activity test,” the Facility is not a 
“fossil-fuel fired” source. The Facility will provide one product: 
electricity. Sylvanergy, slip op. at 5. This electricity comes from 
the Facility’s wood-fired boiler, which harnesses the combustion 
of wood pellets. Id. The ULSD burners start the fire, but have no 
further role in actually generating power. Id. Thus, these start-up 
burners are archetypal support facilities: they play the limited 
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role of “assist[ing] in the production of the principal product”—
electricity—but do not produce it themselves. See Requirements 
for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation 
Plans, 45 Fed. Reg. at 52,695. Accordingly, the primary activity of 
the Facility is biogenic electricity production, and Sylvanergy’s 
Facility does not qualify as a “fossil-fuel fired” source. 
a. EPA’s primary-activity test warrants 
deference. 
Where an agency fills a gap in the statutory scheme, “a court 
may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision 
for” the agency’s “reasonable interpretation.” Chevron, 467 U.S. 
at 844. This remains the case, even though EPA set out the 
primary-activity test in the regulatory preamble rather than the 
regulation itself. An agency interpretation reached “through 
means less formal than ‘notice and comment’ rulemaking” may 
still be entitled to Chevron deference. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 
U.S. 212, 221–22 (2002). Courts determine if Chevron applies by 
considering various deference-conferring factors, such as the 
agency’s expertise, “the importance of the question to the 
administration of the statute, the complexity of that 
administration, and the careful consideration the agency has 
given the question over a long period of time.” Id. at 222. Here, 
several such factors militate in favor of Chevron deference.  
To start, the CAA grants EPA extensive rulemaking 
authority, showing congressional intent that EPA’s words on the 
matter should carry the weight of law. See 42 U.S.C. § 7601; 
Mead, 533 U.S. at 229 (identifying congressional expectation that 
“the agency . . . be able to speak with the force of law” as an 
indicator that Chevron should apply). The scientific and technical 
complexity of the issue strongly favors judicial deference. See 
Marsh v. Ore. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989) 
(requiring courts to be at their “most deferential” when reviewing 
“this kind of scientific determination”). And so does the 
complexity of the Act itself. Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 
1327 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (deferring to agency interpretation in light 
of the “technically complex statutory scheme”). Still more 
importantly, Congress left the “major emitting facility” definition 
alone when it enacted the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. 
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Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399; Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 
575, 580 (1978) (noting that when a statute is amended, Congress 
is presumed to adopt administrative interpretations of any 
sections left unchanged). Finally, the primary-activity test is a 
well-reasoned interpretation of the statute, as it allows EPA to 
efficiently classify multi-activity sources, and has been 
consistently applied for almost forty years. LaFleur, 300 F.3d at 
261 (emphasizing EPA’s long-standing adherence to the primary-
activity test); Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 220 (“[T]his Court will 
normally accord particular deference to an agency interpretation 
of ‘longstanding’ duration.”). 
These factors should weigh heavily in this Court’s analysis. 
Accordingly, the primary-activity test should receive Chevron 
deference despite the preamble’s relative informality. Barnhart, 
535 U.S. at 221–22; accord Nat’l Auto. Dealers Ass’n v. FTC, 864 
F. Supp. 2d 65, 77–78 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (explaining that regulatory 
preambles are worthy recipients of Chevron deference). 
Even if this Court determines that Chevron deference does 
not apply, EPA’s policy should receive substantial Skidmore 
deference. Mead, 533 U.S at 234–35 (explaining that agency 
interpretations receive deference even outside of Chevron). 
Although not binding, agency policies and interpretations 
“constitute a body of experience and informed judgment,” and 
should be afforded deference based on “the thoroughness evident 
in [EPA’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, [and] its 
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements.” Skidmore v. 
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). Skidmore deference carries 
persuasive rather than controlling weight, but is often a deciding 
factor in a complex statutory scheme like the CAA. E.g., Ford 
Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 570 (1980) (reversing 
appellate court for failure to heed federal agency’s “expert 
judgment” contained in nonbinding guidance documents). 
EPA’s thoroughness of consideration is evident in the 
language of the preamble itself. See Requirements for 
Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans, 
45 Fed. Reg. at 52,695. EPA considered and addressed various 
suggestions as to the breadth of the definition and ultimately 
decided to adopt the primary-activity test. Id. Additionally, EPA 
employed sound reasoning in its decision, citing a desire for 
17
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predictability, objectivity, and simplicity in determinations. Id. 
This, coupled with an understanding of the complexity of 
allocating resources, led EPA to a primary-activity determination 
to classify a source based on standard industrial classifications. 
Id. Not only did EPA thoroughly consider this well-reasoned 
policy, it has consistently applied it over the years. See id.; 
LaFleur, 300 F.3d at 261 (emphasizing EPA’s long-standing 
adherence to the primary-activity test). At the very least, EPA’s 
primary-activity test demands substantial Skidmore deference; 
this Court therefore should follow EPA’s interpretation and find 
that the Facility is not a fossil-fuel fired source. 
 B. The Power Plant is a major emitting facility 
because it has the potential to emit more than 250 
tons per year of carbon monoxide, 
notwithstanding the Village of Forestdale’s 
operational limitations. 
Although the proposed Facility is not a “fossil-fuel fired” 
source, it is still a “major emitting facility.” Relevant here is the 
second statutory definition: a “source with the potential to emit 
two hundred and fifty tons per year or more of any air pollutant.” 
42 U.S.C. § 7479(1). Congress did not define the term “potential 
to emit” within the confines of the PSD statute. Id. Accordingly, 
EPA promulgated regulations defining a plant’s potential to emit 
as including “restrictions on hours of operation” so long as the 
restriction “is federally enforceable.” See 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(4). 
In an unpublished opinion, the D.C. Circuit vacated this 
definition because it limited the term “potential to emit” to 
include only EPA-enforceable limitations on operation. Chem. 
Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 70 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In response, 
EPA issued guidance to address the D.C. Circuit’s concerns by 
broadening its definition. Office of Air Quality Planning & 
Standards, U.S. EPA, Interim Policy on Federal Enforceability of 
Limitations on Potential to Emit (Jan. 1996) (“Federal 
Enforceability Policy”). This guidance warrants sufficient 
deference to control this Court’s inquiry, and establishes that 
Forestdale’s site plan is not a federally enforceable limitation for 
purposes of the “potential to emit” calculation. 
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i. Under EPA’s Federal Enforceability Policy, the 
Forestdale site plan is not a federally 
enforceable limitation, and therefore this 
Court must judge the Facility’s “potential to 
emit” on its 96% capacity factor. 
EPA’s guidance states that the regulatory term “federal[] 
enforceab[ility]” means “federally enforceable or legally and 
practicably enforceable by a state or local air pollution control 
agency.” Id. at 3–4; see 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(4). In other words, 
operational limitations only come into play when calculating a 
facility’s “potential to emit” if they are enforceable by an 
environmental agency, whether on the federal, state, or local 
level. Federal Enforceability Policy at 3–4. Thus, the emissions 
decrease resulting from the Forestdale site plan’s limitation on 
hours of operation, though environmentally laudable, only affects 
the Facility’s “potential to emit” if the plan can be enforced by 
EPA or NUARB. See id.   
But Forestdale has not empowered either agency to police the 
Facility’s hours of operation; rather, responsibility for 
enforcement falls to the Village of Forestdale’s building inspector. 
Sylvanergy, slip op. at 5. No matter how this Court feels about 
building inspectors, surely it must agree that they are not “state 
or local air pollution control agenc[ies].” Federal Enforceability 
Policy, at 4. Therefore, the hours limitation in the site plan does 
not enter into this Court’s “potential-to-emit” calculus, and the 
Facility’s 96% capacity factor determines its classification under 
the Act. Because the Facility will emit 255 tons per year of carbon 
monoxide when operating at this level, NUARB did not act 
arbitrarily in labeling it a “major emitting facility”; its decision 
should accordingly be affirmed. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).  
a. This Court should defer to the Federal 
Enforceability Policy. 
This Court does not need to be reminded that Chevron 
deference reaches beyond the confines of notice-and-comment 
rulemaking. Supra, Part II.A.ii.a; Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 221–22. 
The congressional expectation that “the agency . . . be able to 
speak with the force of law” may apply independent of formal 
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agency procedures, Mead, 533 U.S. at 229, on a showing of 
deference-conferring factors, Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 222. Several 
such factors are present here. 
First, the Policy’s interpretation has been applied for almost 
twenty years. Id. at 220 (granting “particular deference to an 
agency interpretation of ‘longstanding’ duration”). Second, the 
complexity of the Clean Air Act compels a degree of deference to 
EPA’s administrative efforts, as the Agency has enough 
experience with the Act to navigate its dense provisions. Gen. 
Elec. Co., 53 F.3d at 1327. Third, the scientific expertise 
necessary to administer the Act commands still more deference to 
EPA’s interpretation. Marsh, 490 U.S. at 377. Fourth, the Policy 
reflects thorough consideration. Not only did two high-ranking 
EPA officials sign off on it, but it also contains a thoughtful 
response to the D.C. Circuit’s objections to the original regulation. 
Doe v. Leavitt, 552 F.3d 75, 81 (1st Cir. 2009) (explaining that 
policies generally demonstrate thoroughness of consideration 
when issued by upper-level officials); Federal Enforceability 
Policy at 3–4. And fifth, EPA’s interpretation reaches a 
reasonable result. The Federal Enforceability Policy prevents the 
absurd result of putting the administration of the CAA in the 
inexperienced hands of entities without environmental know-
how—reflecting congressional intent that EPA preside over the 
administration of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 7601. Therefore, this 
Court should grant Chevron deference to the Federal 
Enforceability Policy.  
But even if this Court declines to apply Chevron, the Policy is 
still due substantial Skidmore deference. 323 U.S. at 140; see 
supra, Part II.A.ii.a. It bears repeating that, although merely 
persuasive, Skidmore can be a deciding factor in the 
interpretation of a complex statute like the CAA. Milhollin, 444 
U.S. at 570. And as demonstrated by the sheer number of factors 
compelling deference in this case, EPA’s Policy should decide the 
issue under whichever agency-deference rubric this Court chooses 
to apply. Accordingly, because the hours limitation is not 
federally enforceable, it does not decrease the Facility’s potential 
to emit. Because the Facility will emit 255 tons per year of carbon 
monoxide at 96% capacity, NUARB did not act arbitrarily or 
capriciously in determining it to be a “major emitting facility.” 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol7/iss1/3
  
2016] BEST BRIEF OVERALL  83 
 
III. BECAUSE THE POWER PLANT IS A MAJOR 
EMITTING FACILITY SUBJECT TO PSD REVIEW, 
SYLVANERGY MUST INSTALL BACT FOR 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS. 
The Clean Air Act requires PSD-permit applicants to install 
“the best available control technology for each pollutant [that is] 
subject to regulation under [the Act]” and emitted by the facility. 
42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (emphasis added). In other words, BACT 
applies not only to the pollutants that trigger the “major emitting 
facility” threshold, see id. § 7479(3), but to every emitted 
pollutant regulated by the CAA. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 
134 S.Ct. 2427, 2448 (2014) (“[T]he BACT provision [cannot] bear 
a narrowing construction.”). The notable breadth of this provision 
is no accident. Rather, it reflects congressional recognition that 
“preserv[ing], protect[ing], and enhanc[ing] the air quality” in our 
nation’s pristine areas requires across-the-board regulation. 42 
U.S.C. § 7470(2). 
This breadth ties the BACT requirement to the evolving CAA 
landscape—most importantly for purposes of this appeal, the 
long-overdue move toward regulation of greenhouse gases. 
Because of EPA’s promulgation of greenhouse gas emissions 
standards for motor vehicles, greenhouse gases are now air 
pollutants regulated under the CAA. See Light–Duty Vehicle 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) 
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600) (“Tailpipe Rule”). 
Accordingly, the PSD program requires installation of BACT for 
these gases. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4). And because neither the Act 
nor the case law carves out an exception for the use of biomass 
fuel, Sylvanergy has no legal basis to claim its wood-burning 
plant is exempt from the BACT requirement. Ctr. for Biological 
Diversity v. EPA, 722 F.3d 401 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Once again, this 
Court reviews NUARB’s decision on the markedly deferential 
arbitrary-and-capricious standard. Alaska Dep’t, 540 U.S. at 496–
97; 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
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 A. Greenhouse gases are “subject to regulation” 
under the CAA, and therefore may be subject to 
the BACT requirement. 
After Massachusetts v. EPA read the CAA to authorize 
regulation of greenhouse gases and required EPA to give a 
statutory justification for its failure to do so, see 549 U.S. 497, 532 
(2007), the Agency revamped its air-pollution regulation. See 
Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse 
Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 
66,496, 66,699 (Dec. 15, 2009) (codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1) 
(“Endangerment Finding”) (staking out EPA’s position that 
greenhouse gases endanger public health). The Endangerment 
Finding led to the promulgation of the Tailpipe Rule, in turn 
“automatically trigger[ing] regulation of stationary greenhouse 
gas emitters under” the PSD program. Coal. for Responsible 
Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 115 (D.C. Cir. 2012), rev’d 
on other grounds, Util. Air, 134 S.Ct. 2427.4 
Sylvanergy cannot keep a straight face and contest the 
applicability of BACT to greenhouse gas emissions. Not only is 
the CAA’s “each pollutant subject to regulation” language so 
broad that the D.C. Circuit considered it beyond the realm of 
reasonable misinterpretation, Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 
323, 404 (1979), but the Supreme Court has definitively closed 
the door on this argument. Util. Air, 134 S.Ct. at 2449. One year 
ago, the Court emphatically rejected this same contention and 
held that “each pollutant subject to regulation” does not “mean 
anything other than what it says.” Id. at 2448. Thus, where a 
source is a “major emitting facility” by virtue of non-greenhouse 
pollutants, EPA may require “compliance with greenhouse-gas 
BACT” so long as “the source emits more than a de minimis 
amount of greenhouse gases.” Id. at 2449.  
 
4. EPA’s admittedly mistaken reading of the Act led it to draft further rules 
to help ease the administrative burden of regulating greenhouse gases, which 
are emitted more commonly and in greater amounts than other pollutants. See 
Util. Air, 134 S.Ct. at 2442–43. The Supreme Court struck these regulations 
down as exceeding the scope of the CAA, id., but expressly approved EPA’s 
position that it may apply BACT to greenhouse gases emitted by a source that is 
a “major emitting facility” by reason of its emission of other pollutants. Id. at 
2449. 
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Sylvanergy has proposed such a source. Not only do its non-
greenhouse emissions qualify it as a major emitting facility, see 
supra Part II.B, but its full-capacity operation will cause the 
emission of a hardly de minimis 350,000 tons per year of 
greenhouse gases, see Sylvanergy, slip op. at 8. Accordingly, 
binding Supreme Court precedent authorizes NUARB’s 
requirement of BACT for greenhouse emissions. Util. Air, 134 
S.Ct. at 2449. 
 B. Sylvanergy’s use of biomass fuel does not exempt 
the Facility from the operation of the Clean Air 
Act—including the requirement to install BACT. 
Sylvanergy is left only with its argument that biomass-fueled 
polluters should be categorically exempt from BACT for 
greenhouse gases. See Sylvanergy, slip op. at 8. To support this 
contention, it points to a temporary EPA regulation that has both 
expired and been vacated by the D.C. Circuit, Biological 
Diversity, 722 F.3d at 409–12, and to controversial (if not 
outdated) science supporting a policy argument with no basis in 
the text of the Act. Neither should persuade this Court. Rather, 
because there is no statutory or regulatory authority for this 
biomass exemption, and the prevailing scientific views undermine 
Sylvanergy’s stance, this Court should uphold NUARB’s 
requirement of BACT for Sylvanergy’s greenhouse gas emissions. 
First, the so-called “Deferral Rule.” Deferral for CO2 
Emissions from Bioenergy and Other Biogenic Sources Under the 
Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Title V 
Programs, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,490 (July 20, 2011) (codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 52, 52, 70, 71) (“Deferral Rule”). In the Deferral Rule, 
EPA sought to delay PSD review of biomass-fueled sources so 
that it could better understand the interplay between the 
greenhouse gases emitted by these sources and the carbon 
sequestration caused by regrowth of the biofuels. Id. at 43,496. 
But no matter how helpful this rule would be to Sylvanergy’s 
present appeal, it is no longer valid. By its own terms the rule 
was to expire more than a year ago. Id. at 43,490. But even before 
its July 2014 expiration date, the D.C. Circuit vacated the rule as 
unjustified by the doctrines of administrative law that EPA 
invoked to justify the regulation. Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at 
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409–12. As a result, Sylvanergy must turn to the statutory text to 
support its claimed exemption. But this, the petitioner cannot do. 
The CAA plainly requires the installation of BACT in major 
emitting facilities. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a). The Act defines a “major 
emitting facility” to include both “fossil-fuel fired” sources with 
potential to emit 100 or more tons per year, and “any other source 
with the potential to emit [250] tons per year or more of any air 
pollutant”; it gives no further qualification on which to base this 
biofuel exception. Id. § 7479(1). Nor do EPA’s definitional 
regulations provide a basis to claim this exception. See 40 C.F.R. 
§ 52.21(b)(1)(i) (no mention of bioenergy). Sylvanergy would have 
this Court rewrite the CAA to add an exception for biomass-
fueled sources—an exception that simply is not there. See 42 
U.S.C. § 7479; Comm’r v. Asphalt Prods. Co., Inc., 482 U.S. 117, 
121 (1987) (explaining that courts may not “disregard what 
Congress has plainly and intentionally provided” in statutory 
text). Such a result is unwarranted by the text, and flouts 
Supreme Court precedent. Util. Air, 134 S.Ct. at 2445 (rejecting 
an attempt to “rewrite[e] unambiguous statutory terms” in § 
169(1) of the Clean Air Act). 
Finally, hobbled by the lack of statutory and regulatory 
support for its position, Sylvanergy limps into a policy appeal. 
The petitioner argued before the EAB that the greenhouse gas 
emissions due to the burning of “biomass fuels such as wood . . . 
are fully offset” by forest regrowth and the resulting “carbon 
sequestration.” Sylvanergy, slip op. at 8. To be sure, this idea once 
warranted serious scientific consideration and was even the basis 
of EPA’s now-vacated Deferral Rule. See Deferral Rule at 43,492. 
But the intervening years of research have not been kind to this 
hypothesis. E.g., Roger A. Sedjo, Comparative Life Cycle 
Assessments: Carbon Neutrality & Wood Biomass Energy 9 (2013) 
(“GHG emissions targets would not be assisted by the use of 
bioenergy.”); accord Carla Santos & Alisha Falberg, Light My 
Fire: The Use & Policies of Woody Biomass as a Heat Source, 15 
Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y 41, 43 (2015) (reviewing the 
scholarship and concluding that “woody biomass for energy can 
no longer be considered a ‘carbon neutral source’”). Thus, not only 
is Sylvanergy’s claimed exemption completely detached from the 
text of the statute; it is bad policy. This Court therefore should 
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uphold NUARB’s application of BACT to Sylvanergy’s greenhouse 
gas emissions. 
IV. NUARB PERMISSIBLY REJECTED WOOD 
GASIFICATION AND PARTIAL CARBON 
CAPTURE AND STORAGE AS BACT BECAUSE 
THE CONCEPT REDEFINES THE FACILITY.  
Here also, this Court asks whether NUARB’s action was 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.” Alaska Dep’t, 540 U.S.at 496–97. It bears 
repeating—this standard of review is notably deferential. See 
supra Part II. 
 A. WGPCCS redefines the Facility because it changes 
the Facility’s fundamental scope. 
Historically, EPA has not asked applicants to redefine their 
sources when considering available control alternatives as part of 
the BACT requirement. NSR Manual at B.13. For example, EPA 
has not required applicants proposing a coal-fired electric 
generator to consider building a natural gas-fired electric turbine 
as part of their BACT analysis, despite the fact that the turbine 
may be inherently less polluting than the generator. Id. 
Admittedly, state agencies have the discretion to engage in a 
“broader analysis,” which might include “the consideration of 
alternative production processes.” Id. But the decision to engage 
or not engage in an analysis beyond standard control technologies 
is committed entirely to the permit authority’s judgment. See id.; 
accord Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831. Here, NUARB permissibly chose 
not to consider alternative production processes as part of its 
BACT analysis. See Sylvanergy, slip op. at 7. 
i. Changing a facility’s “fundamental scope” 
redefines that facility. 
In re Desert Rock Energy Co. outlines the test for whether an 
available control alternative redefines the relevant source. 14 
E.A.D. 484 (EAB 2009). In Desert Rock, the EAB stated, “[T]he 
permit applicant initially ‘defines the proposed facility’s end, 
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object, aim, or purpose—that is the facility’s basic design . . . .’” 
Id. at 530 (footnote omitted) (quoting In re Prairie State 
Generating Co., 13 E.A.D. 1, 22 (EAB 2006)). The permitting 
agency does more than simply rubber stamp the applicant’s 
design, though: the permit issuer should take a “hard look” to 
determine which design elements are inherent and which might 
be changed without disrupting the design’s purpose. Id. (quoting 
Prairie State, 13 E.A.D at 26). But the permitting agency has 
“broad discretion” to determine the mutability or immutability of 
design elements. Id. 
Prairie State and Desert Rock outline the dichotomy between 
available control alternatives that redefine their source—and 
that might be permissibly rejected—and those that must be 
treated in the BACT analysis. In Prairie State, the EAB refused 
to require consideration of an alternative fuel (low-sulfur coal) as 
possible BACT for a proposed coal-fired power plant co-located 
with a high-sulfur coal mine. Prairie State, 13 E.A.D. at 28; see 
also Sylvanergy, slip op. at 13. The power plant in Prairie State 
was designed to burn the locally available coal, so requiring low-
sulfur coal as BACT would have impermissibly “redefined” the 
source. Prairie State, 13 E.A.D. at 28; see also Sylvanergy, slip op. 
at 13.  
The Seventh Circuit upheld the Prairie State decision in 
Sierra Club v. EPA, 499 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 2007). The appellate 
court emphasized that “to convert the design from that of a mine-
mouth plant to one that burned coal obtained from a distance 
would require that the plant undergo significant modifications.” 
Id. at 655 (emphasis added). In light of EPA precedent, the court 
wrote against requiring proposed facilities to change their 
“fundamental scope” or an “inherent aspect of the proposed 
project.” Id. at 655–56. The court noted that when it is not 
obvious where to draw the line between control technology and 
redesign, “it makes sense to let the [agency] . . . draw it, within 
reason.” Id. at 655.  
 Post-Prairie State and Sierra Club, the EAB handed down 
its decision in Desert Rock and granted EPA’s motion for 
voluntary remand of a PSD permit it had issued for a proposed 
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coal-fired electric generating facility.5 Desert Rock, 14 E.A.D. at 
540. The Board also remanded the permit on the independent 
ground that EPA had “abused its discretion” in declining to 
consider IGCC as part of its BACT analysis. Id. The Board found 
two facts important: first, EPA failed to provide a rational 
explanation why IGCC would redefine the source, particularly 
when the applicant itself had indicated that IGCC was a 
technology capable of satisfying its business purpose; second, 
EPA failed to adequately explain its conclusion when IGCC had 
been analyzed at similar facilities. Id. at 538. The Board 
remanded the PSD permit for EPA to provide further explanation 
for its determination that IGCC would redefine the source, or for 
the Agency to include IGCC in its BACT analysis. Id. at 539. 
ii. WGPCCS changes the fundamental scope of 
the Facility. 
The present case mirrors Prairie State and differs 
significantly from Desert Rock. Similar to Sierra Club (which 
upheld Prairie State), conversion of Sylvanergy’s proposed facility 
from one that “generate[s] electricity by burning wood” to one 
that generates electricity by “gasifying wood and burning gas” 
would require the Facility to undergo “significant modifications.” 
Sylvanergy, slip op. at 13; Sierra Club, 499 F.3d at 655. It would 
change the Facility’s “fundamental scope” by altering an 
“inherent aspect of the proposed project”—namely the primary 
means of electricity generation at the facility, burning wood. 
Sierra Club, 499 F.3d at 655–56.  
Even if this Court believes that WGPCCS straddles the line 
between control technology and redesign of the Facility, NUARB’s 
determination of redesign was hardly arbitrary. See id. at 656 
(citing Alaska Dep’t, 540 U.S. at 496–97) (“We hesitate in a 
 
5. It bears emphasizing that the remand in Desert Rock was voluntary. The 
Board did nothing that EPA did not want it to do. EPA itself approached the 
Board seeking remand of the permit, for a variety of reasons. Desert Rock, 14 
E.A.D. at 488–89. Among them: so that it might reconsider its failure to include 
integrated gasification combined cycle (“IGCC”) in its BACT analysis. Id. at 488. 
Unsurprisingly, the case for remand is stronger when the agency itself pushes 
for remand. Cf. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831 (noting the peculiar expertise of 
agencies). 
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borderline case . . . to pronounce the [agency’s] decision arbitrary 
. . . .”). There is a distinction in this case between the tendency of 
WGPCCS to redesign the Facility and its availability as a 
potential control technology. But that distinction is one of degree, 
and potentially minute; the treatment of such differences in a 
technically complex field with limited statutory guidance "is 
entrusted to the judgment of the agency.” Id. (citing Chevron, 467 
U.S. at 842–43). 
 Different from Desert Rock, NUARB did not file a motion 
for voluntary remand of the PSD permit issued to Sylvanergy. To 
be sure, the Board in Desert Rock also found an independent 
ground for remand: EPA abused its discretion in declining to 
consider IGCC as part of its BACT analysis, based on the scant 
administrative record. See Desert Rock, 14 E.A.D. at 540. But 
with EPA’s motion for voluntary remand firmly situated at the 
heart of the proceedings in Desert Rock, the Board’s focus on 
remand rather than agency discretion was unremarkable. This 
Court should accordingly place little emphasis on the Board’s 
independent ground for remand in Desert Rock. 
Even so, the two factors that led the EAB to independently 
remand in Desert Rock are not present here. There is no evidence 
that Sylvanergy represented at any point that WGPCCS was a 
technology that could be considered for its facility, i.e., that could 
satisfy its business purpose. See generally Sylvanergy. Neither is 
there evidence of previously issued permits at facilities similar to 
Sylvanergy’s in which WGPCCS was analyzed. See generally id. 
NUARB was under no obligation to offer an enhanced 
explanation, like that required under the tenets of Desert Rock, 
for its determination that WGPCCS redefines the Facility. The 
agency only had to give a traditional “hard look” at the facility’s 
alleged purpose and had broad discretion to make its redesign 
determination from there. See Desert Rock, 14 E.A.D. at 530. 
NUARB did just that, and permissibly rejected WGPCCS as 
BACT for the Facility. 
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 B. NUARB’s analysis was sufficiently rigorous 
because the agency considered carbon capture 
and storage generally, among other alternatives, 
in line with EPA guidance. 
Lending support to the rigor of its BACT analysis, NUARB 
considered carbon capture and storage generally and rejected it 
as technically infeasible at the Facility. See Sylvanergy, slip op. at 
6. Where greenhouse gas emissions are the subject of BACT 
analysis, EPA guidance classifies carbon capture and 
sequestration as an “available” add-on pollution control 
technology. See Office of Air and Radiation, U.S. EPA, Guidance 
for Determining Best Available Control Technology for Reducing 
Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Bioenergy Production 13 (2011) 
(“Guidance—Bioenergy Production”). Furthermore, EPA guidance 
states that carbon capture and sequestration “should be listed” as 
part of BACT analysis for greenhouse gases, although “[t]his does 
not necessarily mean [it] should be selected.” Id. at 14. NUARB 
adhered to EPA’s guidance: “It first considered . . . carbon capture 
and storage,” but rejected that concept because “there was no 
proven technology.” Sylvanergy, slip op. at 6.  
WGPCCS differs significantly from carbon capture and 
sequestration. The former partially incorporates the latter, but it 
also adds the specific design element of wood gasification to the 
generalized concept of carbon capture and storage. EPA directs 
that carbon capture and sequestration should be included, at 
least initially, in BACT analysis for greenhouse gases. See 
Guidance—Bioenergy Production at 14. But EPA leaves to the 
discretion of permitting agencies whether to include more 
specialized, design-specific forms of carbon capture and 
sequestration, such as WGPCCS, in BACT analysis. To 
understand otherwise—to require inclusion of specialized forms 
of carbon capture and sequestration—is to read into EPA 
guidance words that simply are not there. See Schooler v. United 
States, 231 F.2d 560, 564 (8th Cir. 1956) (“Confusion results when 
an attempt is made to read into the law words which are not 
there.”). Regardless, NUARB’s consideration of carbon capture 
and storage as BACT for the Facility demonstrates the agency’s 
commitment to EPA guidance and the overarching rigor with 
which it conducted its BACT analysis. 
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V. NUARB PROPERLY IMPOSED THE 
SUSTAINABLE FOREST PLAN AS BACT 
BECAUSE THE PLAN IS NOT A “BEYOND-THE-
FENCE” MEASURE, AND REGARDLESS, THE 
CAA DOES NOT OUTLAW SUCH MEASURES. 
Again, this Court may only ask whether NUARB’s action was 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.” Alaska Dep’t, 540 U.S. at 496–97. It bears 
emphasizing—this standard of review is quite deferential. See 
supra Part II. 
 A. Biofuel combustion is not—of itself—BACT 
because the process can act as a net source of 
carbon. 
Before the EAB, Sylvanergy took the position that NUARB 
impermissibly imposed the Sustainable Forest Plan as BACT 
because, “since all biofuels are renewable fuels, biofuel 
combustion should be considered BACT per se without any 
additional controls.” Sylvanergy, slip op. at 11. This position is 
untenable in light of EPA guidance and scientific authority. See 
generally Guidance—Bioenergy Production; supra Part II 
(concerning the deference due agency proclamations). In essence, 
Sylvanergy contends that “the combustion of biofuels, by its very 
nature, is fully offset by the carbon sequestration effects of biofuel 
production.” Sylvanergy, slip op. at 11. Sylvanergy glosses over a 
principle fatal to its position, though. 
Carbon sequestration can indeed offset the combustion of 
biofuels, but it does not always do so fully. See Guidance—
Bioenergy Production at 6; accord Santos & Falberg, supra Part 
III.B (concluding that biomass is not a “carbon neutral” source). 
EPA guidance states, “[B]iogenic carbon stocks can act as a sink . 
. . .” Guidance—Bioenergy Production at 6 (emphasis added). But 
importantly, the guidance also notes that “if more carbon is 
released than is sequestered, plant biomass acts as a net source of 
carbon.” Id. (emphasis added). When plant biomass is a net 
source of carbon, “[g]reenhouse gases emitted by the facility are 
still pollutants, and they may still be subject to controls.” See 
Sylvanergy, slip op. at 11. 
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At the permitting stage, Sylvanergy did not provide evidence 
to NUARB that its facility will be a net sink for carbon, rather 
than a net source of carbon. See generally id. Sylvanergy’s 
proposed facility has the potential to emit 350,000 tons per year 
of carbon dioxide equivalents.6 Id. at 5. Yet Sylvanergy “made no 
commitment that its fuel sources [will] be sustainably harvested,” 
and thus no commitment that its facility’s “net atmospheric 
impact [will be] accounted for and . . . negative or zero.” Id. at 11 
(emphasis added); Guidance—Bioenergy Production at 8 
(highlighting the importance of a net-negative or zero 
atmospheric impact); see also Santos & Falberg, supra Part III.B. 
 B. The Sustainable Forest Plan is not a “beyond-the-
fence” measure because it is entirely within the 
control of Sylvanergy, and regardless, the CAA 
does not outlaw such measures. 
Sylvanergy also takes the position that NUARB 
impermissibly imposed the Sustainable Forest Plan as BACT for 
its facility because “BACT cannot include ‘beyond-the-fence’ 
mitigation measures unrelated to the control of the actual 
emissions from the facility.” Id. at 11. This argument fails for two 
reasons: first, because the Plan is not a beyond-the-fence 
measure; second, and regardless of the first reason, because the 
CAA does not proscribe such measures. 
i. The Plan is entirely within the control of 
Sylvanergy. 
To the first point, the Sustainable Forest Plan is not a 
“beyond-the-fence” measure. The decisive factor in whether a 
measure is beyond the fence is control. See Carbon Pollution 
Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,829, 34,888 (June 18, 
2014) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). For a measure to be beyond 
the fence, it must be “implemented outside of the affected units 
 
6. The Facility will in fact emit 262,500 tons per year in light of its 
operating limits. See Sylvanergy, slip op. at 5. But those limits are not federally 
enforceable, and therefore do not affect the potential-to-emit calculation. See 
supra Part II.B. 
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and outside their control.” Id. (emphasis added). The Sustainable 
Forest Plan is not outside the control of Sylvanergy, though. See 
Sylvanergy, slip op. at 11–12 (finding that the Plan is “entirely 
within the control of Sylvanergy”). The Facility encompasses the 
dedicated reforestation area, such that one part of the Facility 
tempers emissions from another part of the Facility. Id. 
ii. The CAA does not outlaw beyond-the-fence 
measures. 
Second, even if the Sustainable Forest Plan is a beyond-the-
fence measure, the CAA does not outlaw such measures: many 
provisions of the Act are open-ended and lend themselves—often 
intentionally—to agency discretion. See Util. Air, 134 S. Ct. at 
2439 (“[W]e presume that when an agency-administered statute 
is ambiguous with respect to what it prescribes, Congress has 
empowered the agency to resolve the ambiguity.”).  
Given that statutory leeway, EPA guidance suggests that 
beyond-the-fence measures are appropriate for BACT 
consideration in the context of greenhouse gas emissions: 
“[B]ecause sequestration of CO2 emissions in living plant material 
outside the boundaries of the facility may counteract the 
emissions from such facilities on a continuous basis, this unique 
dynamic merits consideration in the BACT analysis.” Guidance—
Bioenergy Production at 8. Greenhouse gases are “well-mixed” in 
the atmosphere, so “the need to reduce them directly at the 
facility is of lesser importance so long as their net atmospheric 
impact is accounted for and is negative or zero.” Id.; cf. Carbon 
Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: 
Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. at 34,888–89 
(“[W]e propose that the provisions of CAA section 111 do not by 
their terms preclude the BSER [Best System of Emission 
Reduction] from including [beyond-the-fence] measures.”). This 
Court should effectuate EPA’s reasonable understanding of 
greenhouse gas science and the BACT requirement and allow 
consideration of beyond-the-fence measures. See Fed. Exp. Corp. 
v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 403 (2008) (holding that where 
ambiguity exists, “the agency may choose among reasonable 
alternatives”). 
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 C. NUARB had a cogent rationale for selecting the 
Sustainable Forest Plan. 
SOC argues that NUARB impermissibly imposed the 
Sustainable Forest Plan as BACT because the Plan “should have 
been rejected . . . as having unacceptable adverse environmental 
impacts.” Sylvanergy, slip op. at 12. Namely, SOC alleges that the 
Sustainable Forest Plan will “destroy biodiversity and promote 
tree diseases and pest invasions.” Id. The EAB noted that 
NUARB did not specifically address SOC’s concerns at 
permitting, but the Board also went on to find “no clear error” in 
the agency’s failure to treat them. Id. 
NUARB is under no obligation to respond directly to every 
comment it receives from all interested parties.  See Am. Airlines, 
Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 202 F.3d 788, 797 (5th Cir. 2000); see also 
Alaska Dep’t, 540 U.S. at 497. The issuance of a PSD permit is an 
informal adjudication, as the CAA does not require that the 
determination be made “on the record after opportunity for an 
agency hearing.” 5 U.S.C § 554(a) (emphasis added); see also 
Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 727 F.2d 
1195, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (explaining that formal adjudications 
are only necessary where the statute requires a determination 
“on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing”) 
(emphasis added); compare 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(2) (no such 
requirement). And “an agency can define its own procedures for 
conducting an informal adjudication,” which do not have to 
include addressing each comment it receives. Am. Airlines, 202 
F.3d at 797 (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 
U.S. 633, 655-56 (1990)); see also Sierra Club v. Peterson, 185 
F.3d 349, 367 n.26 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Pension Benefit, 496 
U.S. at 655) (“An ‘informal adjudication [like the PSD-permit 
process] . . . contains only ‘minimal requirements[.]’”).  
Moreover, in the context of a BACT determination, “[e]ven 
when an agency explains its decision with ‘less than ideal clarity,’ 
a reviewing court will not upset the decision on that account ‘if 
the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.’” Alaska Dep’t, 
540 U.S. at 497 (citation omitted). NUARB had a cogent rationale 
for selecting the Sustainable Forest Plan as BACT for the 
Facility. See Sylvanergy, slip op. at 7. The agency grounded its 
decision in the economic feasibility of the Plan, and its estimated 
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70% offset of the facility’s greenhouse gas emissions. Id. Supreme 
Court precedent will not allow this Court to “upset” NUARB’s 
decision. Alaska Dep’t, 540 U.S. at 497. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
This Court lacks jurisdiction over the NAD denial. The denial 
was neither the end of NUARB’s decisionmaking process nor a 
determination of Sylvanergy’s rights and obligations, and 
accordingly was not the sort of “final action” this Court has the 
power to review. Sylvanergy cannot avoid this result by twisting 
the words of the APA, because the denial was committed to 
NUARB’s discretion and therefore outside the purview of the 
APA’s judicial-review provisions. 
Even if this Court can review the “major emitting facility” 
determination, NUARB did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in 
so classifying the Facility. Although the plain text of the CAA and 
EPA’s primary-activity test show that the Facility’s ULSD start-
up burners do not make it a fossil-fuel fired source, the Facility is 
still a major emitter by reason of its potential to emit more than 
250 tons per year of carbon monoxide. The site plan imposed by 
the Village of Forestdale is not a federally enforceable limitation 
under EPA guidance, and consequently does not affect the 
Facility’s potential to emit. Accordingly, NUARB did not act 
arbitrarily in finding the Power Plant to be a major emitting 
facility. 
Similarly, NUARB’s requirement of BACT for the Facility’s 
greenhouse gas emissions was neither arbitrary nor capricious. 
EPA regulation of greenhouse gases in the motor-vehicle context 
triggered PSD requirements for greenhouse emissions, as 
recognized by the Supreme Court. Because the Facility will emit 
a massive amount of greenhouse gases per year, and neither the 
Act itself nor sound policy allow for a biofuel-plant exemption, 
NUARB properly required Sylvanergy to install BACT for 
greenhouse emissions. 
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And finally, NUARB’s robust procedures and peculiar 
expertise were at their zenith when the agency selected the 
Sustainable Forest Plan as BACT for the Facility. The agency 
employed a rigorous top-down approach to analyze the available 
control alternatives—the same diligent approach outlined by EPA 
guidance. The Plan represented the most effective, technically 
feasible alternative that did not require Sylvanergy to change the 
fundamental scope of its project. The Plan is a sensible 
alternative—economically manageable, technically effective, and 
accessible to Sylvanergy. NUARB properly selected it as BACT 
for the Facility.  
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